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STATE OF TENNESSEE V. GILBERT

COMMENTARY
By Thad Cwiklinski

“

“We have never suggested that this right to impartiality and fairness
protects against only certain classes of prejudice or extends to only certain
groups in the population… It is unsurprising, then, that this Court has
invalidated decisions reached by juries with a wide variety of different
prejudices.” 1

—U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall

The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an “impartial jury” is an essential tenet of American jurisprudence. In criminal
trials, courts implement an array of safeguards to prevent prejudicial information from reaching jurors and to
keep verdicts unbiased. The voir dire process and juror anonymity are intended to accomplish these goals and,
if they fail, judges may set aside jury verdicts that are “contrary to law and the evidence.”2 In Peña-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, the Supreme Court recognized the necessity of combatting juror bias.3 The Court held that when a juror
demonstrates that her conviction of a defendant is based on racial bias or animus, the verdict may be thrown out.4
To do so, though, it must be “clear” from the juror’s statements that the juror acted on racial bias.5 Indeed, many
jurors may not show enough outward bias to reach the high Peña-Rodriguez standard. Nevertheless, the case still
marks a welcome departure from a justice system that favors finality but ignores juror bias.
Issues of racial bias in the jury room become
complicated, however, when prejudicial
information comes from the room itself
rather than the jurors. Ideally, a jury room
is a sacrosanct place where jurors may
discuss a case free from outside pressures
and influences to administer justice, not
decisions based on personal belief.6 In
State of Tennessee v. Gilbert,7 this was
not the case.
In Gilbert, white jurors deliberated and
convicted Tim Gilbert, a Black man, in a
setting more reminiscent of a Civil War
battleground than a sanctuary. The jury
deliberated to convict Gilbert in the Giles
County Courthouse’s “United Daughters of
the Confederacy Room” (“U.D.C. room”).8
The United Daughters of the Confederacy,
an organization for female descendants of
Confederate soldiers, preserves the legacies

of these Confederate soldiers and “the Lost
Cause.” Since its inception, the organization
carried out its mission through massive
fundraising efforts for monuments to
Confederate leaders as well as to the Ku Klux
Klan.9 At times, the United Daughters of the
Confederacy even acted as “a public relations
agency” for the white supremacist group.10
The U.D.C. room overflowed with
Confederate memorabilia: had designers
intended solely to pack in as much
prejudicial information as possible, they
could not have been more successful. Even
before entering the room, the twelve white
jurors in Gilbert’s case immediately saw
a glass panel containing a Confederate
flag, U.D.C. insignia and “U.D.C. Room”
emblazoned on the door in gold paint.11
As they entered, jurors were exposed to
more memorabilia, including the room’s
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centerpiece: an unmistakable Confederate
battle flag. In the anomaly that someone
did not recognize the massive flag’s glaring
blue “X” slashed across a red background, it
was labeled “Confederate Flag, Property of
Giles County Chapter #257 UDC.”12 Portraits
of Confederate leaders encircled the room.
One portrait even designated the president
of the Confederacy as “President Jefferson
Davis” (rather than “Confederate President
Jefferson Davis”). A framed letter from the
national leader of the United Daughters of
the Confederacy rounded out the room’s
decor.13
Strikingly, the jury deliberations in the
United Daughters of the Confederacy
Room in Gilbert’s case were not a “one-off
thing” resulting from a scheduling issue
or isolated incompetence. Instead, the
United Daughter of the Confederacy Room

served as the default jury room in the Giles
County Courthouse for at least the past 43
years without anyone challenging its effect
on jurors.14 Countless defendants before
Gilbert, many of them Black, had their fates
decided in the same environment.
Gilbert argued that white jurors deciding
a Black man’s freedom in a Confederate
shrine—that is also a jury room—
exposed the jury to extraneous prejudicial
information which “embolden[ed] jurors to
act on racial animus.”15 The State merely
responded that 1) Gilbert had waived
his right to contest the location of jury
deliberations by not raising his concerns
before trial,16 and that 2) since another jury
had acquitted Gilbert of a separate crime
after deliberating in the same room, the
contents of the room were not prejudicial.17
The Circuit Court for Giles County bluntly
rejected both arguments. It held that
defendants need not object to the location
of jury deliberations before trial,18 and
that the defendant’s prior acquittal had
no bearing on the case at hand.19 Further,
the Giles County Circuit Court noted that,
to many Americans, the Confederate flag
represents “the attempt to perpetuate the
subjugation of Black people through chattel
slavery.”20 Accordingly, the Gilbert County
Circuit Court granted Gilbert a new trial.21
While Gilbert offers an egregious example of
a setting prejudicing a jury verdict, its ruling
displays the extreme end of a spectrum,

not a standard line for showing prejudice.
The question remains after Gilbert: When
does the location of jury deliberations cross
the line and become prejudicial to the point
that a new trial is necessary? Hopefully, the
Gilbert ruling will function as a watershed
moment for defendants seeking relief
from jury verdicts originating in overtly
racist environments. For this to occur, it is
imperative that defense attorneys, jurors
and citizens continue to “flag” such flagrant
violations wherever they see them.
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